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Abstract. 
In the last three decades Argentina tripled its crime rate boosting safety at 
the top of mayor concerns of Argentineans which leaves open the question 
about the behavior of incumbent governors of the 23 provinces about anti-
crime measures in the proximity of elections. How do incumbent governors 
react to escalating crime as elections come closer? This paper investigates 
electorally-motivated crime rate fluctuations in Argentina for the period 1984-
2007. District–level dynamic panel data reveals the existence of an electoral 
cycle in the total crime rate as well as in property crimes. 
 
Keywords: Crime, Electoral cycles, Dynamic Panel Data, Argentina. 
Clasificación JEL: K4, I3, D72, P16. 
 
Resumen 
En las últimas tres décadas Argentina triplicó su tasa de delincuencia y el 
tema de la seguridad pasó al tope de las preocupaciones de sus ciudadanos, 
lo que es interesante preguntarse cómo se comportan los gobernadores 
oficialistas de las 23 provincias en las inmediaciones de las elecciones 
respecto de la medidas para reducir la inseguridad. Este trabajo investiga si 
las fluctuaciones en la tasa de delincuencia responden a motivaciones 
electorales. Mediante la estimación de un panel dinámico para 1984-2007, 
encuentro que existe un ciclo electoralmente motivado en la tasa de 
delincuencia general y en la de delitos contra la propiedad. 
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1. Motivation 
Despite turbulent political life during most of the second half of the 20th century, Argentina 
took pride in its relative safety compared with other emergent as well as developed countries, 
but in the 1980s crime rate started an unequivocal upward tendency that became steeper in 
the 1990s and definitively worrisome at the turn of the century when crime rates hit historical 
records. In less than two decades, from 1983 to 2002, Argentina tripled its crime rate. The 
increasing consensus on the media and opinion surveys throughout the country, that crime is 
foremost in voters' consideration, clearly relates the security policy to the electoral cycle.  
How do incumbent governors react to escalating crime as elections come closer? Do they 
attempt to get rapid declines in key indicators by taking short-run but reversible steps or, by 
contrast, they take measures with long-run impact? They know (or envisage) that failing at 
reducing crime could jeopardize their desire to remain in office so It is plausible to conjecture 
that incumbents would likely behave opportunistically as predicted by the theoretical and 
empirical literature on political budget cycles in budgetary matters (Drazen and Eslava, 2005; 
Eslava, 2006; Jones et al., 2009; Meloni, 2010) Do incumbent governors also behave 
opportunistically in safety matters? Do they reinforce anti crime measures, particularly in the 
proximity of elections, to increase their chances to remain in office?  
This paper investigates electorally-induced crime rate fluctuations in Argentine provinces. I 
estimate a dynamic panel data that spans 23 districts for the period 1984-2007. I cover 113 
gubernatorial elections from 1983. By focusing on a single country this paper exploits within-
country variation. This is a remarkable source of variation that goes beyond traditional cross-
country empirical studies.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section discusses theoretical as well as 
empirical literature linking political budget cycle and crime. Section 3 looks briefly at the 
behavior of crime in Argentina. Section 4 describes the empirical investigation and Section 5 
presents the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Crime rate and elections  
The Political Budget Cycles (hereafter PBC) literature is conclusive about the behavior of 
incumbents in the neighborhood of elections. Theoretical models (Rogoff and Siebert, 1988; 
Persson and Tabellini, 2000) as well as the copious empirical discussion find that 
incumbents engage in opportunistic pre-election profligacy to influence voters and maximize 
chances to remain in office. Both, cross-country studies, like Brender and Drazen (2005) and 
subnational-level panel data, like Galli and Rossi (2002) Petry et al. (1999), Lema (2009), to 
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cite a few, support PBC. Still, the literature on PBC hardly explains how expenditure 
influences voters. That is, what are the operating channels through which expenditure twist 
voters’ preferences? It is implicitly assumed that incumbents invest in goods and services 
highly valued by constituencies. Hence, if crime rate is at the top among voters’ worries, 
incumbents should devote resources and efforts to reverse or minimize negative indicators. If 
anti-crime policies impact predominantly in the short-run, then a crime rate cycle should be 
observed. This opens a question about the instruments available to opportunistic 
incumbents. Is opportunism limited to changes in the expenditure and expenditure 
composition as reported by the PBC literature? Besides the emblematic increases in police 
numbers and means for patrolling, are there any other policies that can affect critical 
variables in the short-run? Some candidates are: displacement of police forces to critical 
areas (those showing higher criminal activity), targeting prolific offenders, electronic 
monitoring to reduce recidivism rates of ex-prisoners and working on managerial issues such 
as promotions at the top of the organization pyramid (typical, promoting a new Chief of 
Police)  
Despite this reasonable presumption about opportunism in criminal policy, investigations 
linking elections and crime are still scanty. Some of the papers treat the topic as inputs to 
demonstrate the effect of deterrence, like Levitt (1997) or McCrary (2002) that rely on police 
hiring during elections to estimate the effect of police on crime. Other papers focus mainly on 
the behavior of elected judges facing polls. Dyke (2007) presents evidence on the effects of 
district attorney elections in North Carolina on criminal case outcomes. He finds that 
defendants face a higher probability of conviction and a lower probability of having all 
charges dismissed in an election year. The results suggest that in election years, District 
Attorneys are more likely to prosecute cases that might otherwise be dismissed. The 
estimated effects are more pronounced for defendants charged with property or drug crimes 
than for defendants charged with violent crimes, and more pronounced in districts with more 
electoral competition. Similarly, Berdejó and Yuchtman (2010) show that Washington State 
judges respond to political pressure by sentencing serious crimes more severely. They found 
that sentences are around 10% longer at the end of a judge's political cycle than the 
beginning; deviations above the sentencing guidelines increase by 50% across the electoral 
cycle.  
Ghosh (2006) is the nearest reference of this study. He uses annual data on the major Indian 
states to investigate the effect of the timing of elections on the crime rate. He finds that 
scheduled elections are associated with a fall in both, property crimes and violent crimes.  
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3. Criminal  behavior in Argentina 
In 1983 Argentina could proudly show the return to democracy after several years of military 
regime and one of the lowest crime rates in America, just 1167 offenses per 100,000 
inhabitants. But crime had been climbing steadily since the beginning of the decade so it did 
not surprise that, by the end of the 1980s, crime rate have grown 74%. A sharp descend in 
the early 1990s could not be sustained and crime initiated a new impetuous upward trend. In 
2002, amid the greatest crisis in nation’s life, crime rate have reached 3573 offenses per 
100,000 inhabitants, history’s highest. Victimization surveys conducted by Universidad Di 
Tella in the most populated cities of Argentina show that one third of the households suffered 
from crime in 20071. 
As offenses hiked and violent crime soared and seemed to be out of police control, 
population organized massive protests demanding for safety and claiming deeper 
investigation in many unresolved murders. The paradigmatic cases of Maria Soledad 
Morales in the province of Catamarca (1990), Walter Bulacio in the City of Buenos Aires 
(1991), Omar Carrasco in Neuquén (1994), Jose Luis Cabezas in Buenos Aires (1997) to 
cite a few, derived in huge popular demonstrations that took the issue of safety to media and 
alerted politicians about their importance for election results. In 2004, after the murder of 
Axel Blumberg, more than 100,000 people marched in the city of Buenos Aires demanding 
criminal-justice reform. Besides, numerous property crime (some violent) also have 
significant media coverage.  
The solid augment in crime convinced Argentineans that their country become much more 
dangerous, but data present high variability across districts: those with the fastest crime rate 
expansion during the period under study were the City of Buenos Aires with an average 
annual growth rate of 8.2%, San Luis (7.5%) and Santa Cruz (6.6%). The provinces of 
Chubut and Buenos Aires also had significant increases in their annual average crime rates, 
exceeding 5%. In opposition, Chaco and Santiago del Estero had the lowest annual rate of 
growth, 0.6% in both provinces. In most of the districts property crimes (robbery, burglary 
and larceny) represented more than 50% of total felonies. 
Soaring crimes rates hit politicians that reacted promising to be tough with criminals. The 
paradigmatic case was Carlos Ruckauf, former Vice President and governor of the province 
of Buenos Aires that campaigned in 1999 with the lemma “bullets to the criminals”. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 Victimization surveys ask people whether they have been the victims of crimes. 
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Table 1. Evolution of the Total Crime Rate in Argentina.  
Districts 
Offenses per 100,000 
inhabitants Annual Growth rate 
1983-2007 (%) 
Average 
AVG 
Standard 
Deviation 
STD 
STD/AVG 
1983 2007 
Buenos 
Aires 452.8 1646.8 5.5 1402 611.8 0.44 
Catamarca 1654.8 4920.6 4.6 2714 1070.2 0.39 
Chaco 2217.4 2552.0 0.6 5922 4770.1 0.81 
Chubut 757.6 3454.3 6.5 3246 2330.6 0.72 
Córdoba 1927.5 4157.2 3.3 2174 794.2 0.37 
Corrientes 1137.0 2405.9 3.2 1562 295.2 0.19 
Entre Ríos 925.0 2186.0 3.6 1633 428.1 0.26 
Formosa 1062.7 2106.3 2.9 1645 672.3 0.41 
Jujuy 2158.4 3441.2 2.0 3005 951.5 0.32 
La Pampa 1218.7 2890.0 3.7 2948 922.8 0.31 
La Rioja 1059.9 1885.4 2.4 1899 558.8 0.29 
Mendoza 1988.8 6075.0 4.8 3709 1833.7 0.49 
Misiones 735.3 1921.9 4.1 1551 558.3 0.36 
Neuquén 2019.7 5849.0 4.5 4335 1636.0 0.38 
Río Negro 1673.7 2992.9 2.5 2525 764.4 0.30 
Salta 2860.2 4648.7 2.0 3585 993.2 0.28 
San Juan 1802.7 3771.7 3.1 2877 1153.2 0.40 
San Luis 442.8 2509.1 7.5 1588 650.1 0.41 
Santa Cruz 1160.0 5399.4 6.6 3284 1708.8 0.52 
Santa Fe 1929.1 3833.0 2.9 2699 642.1 0.24 
Santiago del 
Estero 1902.5 2177.1 0.6 2111 350.2 0.17 
Tierra del 
Fuego 1184.3 3555.0 4.7 2388 980.4 0.41 
Tucumán 1649.3 2551.2 1.8 1966 424.7 0.22 
City of 
Buenos 
Aires 
1220.5 8145.2 8.2 4417 2486.1 0.56 
Source: Dirección Nacional de Política Criminal and INDEC. 
 
4. Empirical specification  
I estimate the effect of the electoral cycle by merging the standard political budget cycle 
equation (Brender and Drazen, 2005) with the typical supply of offenses (Cerro and Meloni, 
1999): 
CRIME RATEit=  α0 + α1CRIME RATEit-1 + α2ELECTIONit +DETERRENCEit + CONTROLSit +εit   (1) 
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The dependent variable CRIME RATE is measured as the number of offenses per 100,000 
inhabitants in a given district i and year t. I work with three dependent variables 
corresponding to the following categories of felonies: property crime, homicides and total 
crime2.  
A distinctive feature of the empirical literature of political budget cycle is the inclusion of a 
dummy variable (ELECTION) that takes the value 1 if the gubernatorial election is held 
during year t; -1 in the year following the election, and 0 otherwise. I consider that t is an 
election year if the voting ballot was carried out from May to December. Governors have 
agenda power to set elections dates which might raise endogeneity problems, a frequent 
issue in political budget cycles studies. Nonetheless, elections dates are barely moved more 
than six months and usually restricted to the year the election was originally scheduled by 
laws or constitutional arrangements what eliminates the potential estimation problem since I 
work with annual data. This study covers five of the seven gubernatorial elections carried out 
in Argentina since democracy was recovered, in 1983. Gubernatorial elections took place 
regularly in most of the 23 districts analyzed every four years, in 1983, 1987, 1991, 1995, 
1999, 2003 and 2007. I excluded the 1983 election because there was no party allied with 
the military regime, so I could not treat any party as incumbent in that election. I also 
excluded from the data set the federal District (City of Buenos Aires - CABA) because 
security forces do not depend on the Chief of Government but on the President.  
The vector DETERRANCE includes the variable Condemnatory Sentences to capture the 
deterrence effect of the probability of conviction, calculated as the ratio of total condemnatory 
sentences to total reported offenses. This variable is only available for Total Crime. 
The vector CONTROLS contain political and economic variables such as the Rate of 
Unemployment, GDP per Capita and the Rate of Growth of GDP per Capita to control for an 
environment prone to crime. Earning opportunities influence the allocation of time and effort 
in legal and illegal labor markets therefore, at the margin, higher rates of unemployment are 
expected to increase illicit undertakings because they diminish the rate of return of legal 
activities (Cerro and Meloni, 2000). On the other hand, richer provinces, those with a higher 
GDP per capita, are expected to be more attractive for criminals since they involve larger and 
better opportunities for illegal activities. The rate of growth of GDP per capita is included to 
capture the pure income effect. If criminal activity were an inferior good, the pure income 
effect would be negative. The set of explanatory variables also include Urbanization Rate 
and First Term. The former, defined as the percentage of urban population in each province 
is included to control for the effects of large agglomerations on crime: in a closely knit 
                                                          
2
 Notice that total crime rate does not include felonies subject to federal jurisdiction such as drug trafficking, smuggling, 
counterfeiting, etc. 
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neighborhood the presence of strangers is easily noticed so the cost of crime is higher. The 
latter is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the governor is serving his/her first 
gubernatorial term and 0 in cases of reelection and federal intervention. This variable 
attempts to capture the usual deterioration in governance affecting second and third terms. 
Except for CONDEMNATORY SENTENCE and FIRST TERM control variables were lagged 
one period to avoid estimation biases due to endogeneity and to lessen the omitted variable 
bias related to contemporaneous shocks that affect each explanatory variable and the crime 
rate. Table 2 provides summary statistics for each of the variables analyzed. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total Crime Rate 552 2601.78 1230.07 485.4 7899 
Property Crime Rate 552 1723.98 849.49 217.9 4860 
Homicide 552 7.96 7.81 0 61.98 
Condemnatory Sentences  552 2.58 2.17 0 14.54 
Election 552 0.04 0.67 -1 1 
Rate of Unemployment 552 9.59 4.73 1 25.5 
GDP per capita  552 360.88 248.06 93.9 1811.2 
Rate of growth GDP per capita  552 1.72 9.77 -36.88 46.3 
Urbanization rate  552 79.48 9.01 55.0 97.5 
First Term 552 0.73 0.44 0 1 
 
My empirical specifications include the lagged dependent variable to handle the inertia of the 
crime rate and the asymmetric response of crime to economic opportunities and deterrence 
reported by Mocan and Bali (2005). They found that increases in the crime rate are sharper 
but decreases are gradual.  
 
5. Results 
Econometric estimations of equation (1) are displayed in Table 2. I use the Arellano-Bond 
technique with robust standard errors. As a robustness check I also estimated it with OLS 
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with fixed effects3. Results of this alternative technique, which differ slightly with the ones on 
Table 2, are presented in the Appendix. I find strong evidence of an electoral cycle in 
property crimes and total crime rate. In fact, total crime rate diminishes, on average, 75 
offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in election years but resumes the year after elections. 
Similarly, Property Crime rates fall 56 offenses in election years. Both results indicate that 
incumbent governors manipulate instruments at hand namely expenditures on security, 
police force hiring and management changes and adjustments, etc., to affect crime rate4. 
Conversely, Homicide shows no statistical significant changes in election years. 
Table 2. Dynamic Panel data Estimations. 
Period:  1984 -2007   Provinces: 23   Observations: 552 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent variables 
Total Crime Property Crime 
Homicide 
I II III IV 
Total Crime Rate (t-1) 0.6448*** (0.0893) 
0.6572*** 
(0.0865)   
Property Crime Rate (t-1)   0.6512*** (0.0758)  
Homicide (t-1)    0.5806*** (0.0984) 
ELECTION  -74.9832*** (23.8614) 
-90.6755*** 
(22.7227) 
-56.3055*** 
(15.70844) 
-0.4223 
(0.3277) 
Condemnatory Sentences  -105.6203*** (30.7962)    
Rate of Unemployment (t-1) 17.8349** (8.5392) 
17.2171** 
(8.7737) 
13.1542** 
(5.9063) 
-0.0006 
(0.0548) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.2984 (0.4826) 
0.0625 
(0.5565) 
0.0593 
(0.3283) 
-0.0055 
(0.0066) 
Rate of growth GDP per capita (t-1) -2.9474 (2.3655) 
-4.2539 
(2.8773) 
-3.6648* 
(1.9456) 
-0.0479*** 
(0.0161) 
Urbanization rate (t-1) 31.4515* (18.0327) 
42.8948** 
(19.2159) 
19.8568** 
(9.5387) 
-0.2411** 
(0.1250) 
First Term -74.1672 (56.5091) 
-113.8675** 
(54.4957) 
-76.9139* 
(43.3603) 
0.1203 
(0.8267) 
Constant -1242.450** (1371.603) 
-2529.777* 
(1493.70) 
-1020.314 
(720.527) 
24.3885*** 
(7.9844) 
Arellano-Bond test that average 
autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0.  
H0: no autocorrelation Pr>z= 
0.0591 0.0591 0.0403 0.0091 
Arellano-Bond test that average 
autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.  
H0: no autocorrelation Pr>z= 
0.9635 0.9502 0.8748 0.6727 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10. 
                                                          
3
 The Arellano-Bond estimation method is generally used when N is large (here the number of provinces) and T (time 
periods) is small. My data set has N=T= 23. 
4
 Table 2A in the Appendix shows estimation of a LOG-LINEAR version of equation (1)  
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As expected, the estimated coefficient for deterrence effect is negative and significant at 
usual levels. Also, high levels of unemployment and urbanization spur crime. Conversely, 
governor’s first term is associated with lower crime rates, both total and property. In all four 
regressions, the lag dependent variable is statistical significant and the estimated coefficients 
imply important inertial effects.  
 
6. Concluding remarks  
This paper contributes to the political budget cycle literature as well as to the research on 
crime by presenting further evidence on the opportunistic behavior of incumbent governors in 
Argentina. Governors not only manipulate fiscal variables such as public expenditure and its 
compositions, as reported by previous studies, but also influence the crime rate generating 
electoral cycles in this variable. The argument explaining such manipulation is simple: since 
public safety ranks at the top of Argentineans concerns, incumbent governors dedicate 
additional efforts to get short-run improvements in crime indicators in election years. 
Presumably, incumbents not only dedicate more resources to safety matters but also 
displace police forces to critical areas and work on managerial issues (i.e. changing the 
Police Chief, etc.) to get concrete results on the crime rate. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 1A. Definition and Source of Variables Employed in the Statistical Analysis. 
Abbreviation Description Source 
CRIME RATEt,i Total number of offenses per 100,000 inhabitants in year t at district i.  
Dirección Nacional de Política 
Criminal, Ministerio del Interior. 
PROPERTY CRIMEt,i  Number of offenses against property per 100,000 inhabitants in year t at district i. 
Dirección Nacional de Política 
Criminal, Ministerio del Interior 
HOMICIDEit Murders per 100,000 inhabitants in year t at district i. 
Dirección Nacional de Política 
Criminal, Ministerio del Interior 
ELECTIONit 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 in 
gubernatorial election years (t), -1 the 
year t+1, and 0 otherwise. 
Dirección Nacional Electoral  
Electoral map of Andy Tow 
(www.towsa.com/andy) 
CONDEMNATORY 
SENTENCEt-1,i 
Ratio of condemnatory sentences to 
crime in district i at year t. 
Dirección Nacional de Política 
Criminal, Ministerio del Interior. 
Registro Nacional de Reincidencia. 
UNEMPLOYMENTi,t-1: Rate of unemployment in province i at year t-1. (level) 
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y 
Censos (INDEC) 
GDP Per Capitai,t-1 
Real provincial GDP per capita for 
province i (average of the gubernatorial 
term t).  
GDP:  Dirección  de Estadísticas 
Provincial (each district); Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata estimations, 
based on official figures 
Population: Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) 
RATE OF GROWTH 
GDP per Capitait 
Rate of Growth of GDP per capita in 
province i and year t (in percentages) 
GDP:  Dirección  de Estadísticas 
Provincial (each district); Universidad 
Nacional de La Plata estimations, 
based on official figures 
Population: Instituto Nacional de 
Estadísticas y Censos (INDEC) 
URBANIZATION 
RATEit 
Percentage of urban population for 
province i and year t.   
Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas y 
Censos (INDEC) 
FIRST TERMit 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if 
the governor of district i is serving in 
his/her first gubernatorial period and 0 
otherwise.  
Dirección Nacional Electoral  
Electoral map of Andy Tow 
(www.towsa.com/andy) 
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Table 2A. Dynamic Panel data Estimations. Arellano-Bond GMM. Log – Linear Model 
Period:  1984 -2007   Provinces: 23    Observations: 552  
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent variables 
Log Total Crime Log Property Crime 
Log Homicides 
I II III IV 
Log Total Crime Rate (t-1) 0.6527*** (0.0494) 
0.7161*** 
(0.0491)   
Log Property Crime Rate (t-1)   0.6901*** (0.0448)  
Log Homicide (t-1)    0.3109*** (0.1018) 
ELECTION -0.0382*** (0.0087) 
-0.0476*** 
(0.0091) 
-0.0362*** 
(0.0077) 
-0.0509 
(0.0364) 
Condemnatory Sentences  -0.0585*** (0.0100)    
Rate of Unemployment (t-1) 0.0028 (0.0023) 
0.0030 
(0.0023) 
0.0068** 
(0.0027) 
0.0063 
(0.0077) 
GDP per capita (t-1) -0.0003 (0.0002) 
-0.00003 
(0.0023) 
0.00003 
(0.0002) 
-0.0060 
(0.0034 
Rate of growth GDP per capita (t-
1) 
-0.0001 
(0.0008) 
-0.0008 
(0.0010) 
-0.0010 
(-0.0010) 
-0.0060* 
(0.0034) 
Urbanization rate (t-1) 0.0114*** (0.0040) 
0.0148*** 
(0.0044) 
0.0102** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0335*** 
(0.0102) 
First Term -0.0233 (0.0201) 
-0.0433** 
(0.0194) 
-0.0420* 
(0.0220) 
0.1079 
(0.0796) 
Constant 2.0543*** (0.3025) 
1.0803*** 
(0.3294) 
1.4496*** 
(0.3123) 
4.1311*** 
(0.8197) 
Arellano-Bond test that average 
autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0.  
H0: no autocorrelation Pr>z= 
0.0006 0.0006 0.0051 0.0017 
Arellano-Bond test that average 
autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0.  
H0: no autocorrelation Pr>z= 
0.6038 0.2613 0.2147 0.2740 
Notes:  standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10. 
 There are 12 missing observations in Regression IV  
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Table 3A. Dynamic Panel data Estimations.  OLS with fixed-effects 
Period:  1984 -2007   Provinces: 23   Observations: 552 
Explanatory Variables 
Dependent variables 
Total Crime Property Crime Homicides 
I II II V 
Total Crime Rate (t-1) 0.7673*** (0.06763) 
0.7859*** 
(0.0681)   
Property Crime Rate (t-1)   0.7575*** (0.0703)  
Homicide (t-1)    0.5740*** (0.1022) 
ELECTION -86.0215*** (22.5017) 
-97.0616*** 
(23.1952) 
-60.0256*** 
(16.8571) 
-0.4065 
(0.3240) 
Condemnatory Sentences  -69.0507*** (22.2915)    
Rate of Unemployment (t-1) 11.1367 (6.6777) 
9.5715 
(6.2626) 
7.3147*** 
(4.7094) 
0.0841 
(0.0593) 
GDP per capita (t-1) 0.1912 (0.3313) 
0.00118 
(0.3136) 
0.0235 
(0.1849) 
-0.0007 
(0.0027) 
Rate of growth GDP per capita (t-
1) 
-2.7742 
(2.0014) 
-3.3027 
(2.2702) 
-3.2386* 
(1.6489) 
-0.0474** 
(0.0184) 
Urbanization rate (t-1) 16.4698 (11.5012) 
22.8403* 
(11.9416) 
13.2954* 
(7.2859) 
-0.2176** 
(0.0981) 
First Term -64.6172 (38.0904) 
-89.7155* 
(52.0399) 
-57.4335 
(42.2822) 
0.3286 
(0.6334) 
Constant -439.0053 (821.1073) 
-1193.996 
(848.3804) 
-627.2528 
(516.1257) 
19.9036*** 
(6.6476) 
R squared (within) 0.7645 0.7557 0.6996 0.4000 
R squared (between) 0.9409 0.9147 0.9362 0.6934 
R squared (overall) 0.8268 0.8173 0.8084 0.5173 
Note: standard errors in parenthesis below coefficient.    *** Significant at .01.  ** Significant at .05.  * Significant at .10. 
 
